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Question Two. Whether the Bread is Annihilated in its Conversion into the Body of Christ
293. Proceeding thus to the second question [n.88], argument is made that the bread is annihilated in its conversion into the body of Christ.
Because that which existed before, and of which nothing remains, is annihilated; the bread existed before and nothing of it remains, for neither the matter nor form remains; for the whole has been wholly transitioned, namely the matter into matter and the form into form; 
therefore etc 
.
294. Secondly as follows: what is nothing in itself or in another and was something before is annihilated; the bread after the conversion is nothing in itself, and nothing too in the body of Christ, because then the body of Christ would be increased by the conversion of the bread into it; for that becomes greater in which there is one quantum after another that remains.
295. Third as follows: in partial transition the form is annihilated, because nothing of it remains - at least corruption of the bread is only distinguished from annihilation because the prior form remains in the potency of the matter; but in the issue at hand the form of the bread does not remain in the potency of what is receptive of it. One can also prove that the form there from which transition was made is annihilated because it does not remain in act, as is plain; nor does it remain in the potency of the subject, the proof of which is that nature can reduce a natural potency to act, and consequently, if the destroyed form were to remain numerically the same in the potency of the matter, it could be reduced to act by a natural agent - which is against the Philosopher, Physics 5.4.228a9-19, On Generation and Corruption 2.11.338b14-19.
If you say that it does not remain in the potency of the subject the same in number but the same in species - this does not prevent annihilation, because even if it were annihilated, a form different in number could be drawn out of the potency of the matter.
296. Again, annihilation and creation are opposites just as are generation and corruption, because as is said in Physics 5.1.225a12-20 “the term ‘from which’ of generation and the term ‘to which’ of corruption are the same, and conversely.” So the term ‘to which’ of annihilation and the term ‘from which’ of creation are the same, and conversely. But when the whole of the substance is the term ‘to which’ of generation and is so wholly, the production of it is creation; therefore when the whole of it is the term ‘from which’ and is so wholly, the destruction of it is annihilation. But in the issue at hand the whole of it is the term ‘from which’ of the conversion and is so wholly; therefore etc .
297. To the opposite:
Many authorities, adduced in the first part in the preceding question [nn.134-137], say that the bread is converted into the body of Christ; therefore it is not annihilated.
298. And there is argument by reason, because creation and annihilation are opposites; but if the body were converted into the bread, the bringing back again of the bread would not be creation, because it would not be from nothing as from the term ‘from which’; therefore, by parity of reasoning the conversion of the bread into the body is not annihilation.
299. Again, the cause of this annihilation could only be God, to whom alone it belongs to create. But God cannot be the cause of not being a thing, as Augustine proves 83 Questions qq.21-22.
I. To the Question
A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent
1. Exposition of the Opinion
300. One statement here [from Henry of Ghent] is that the bread is not annihilated, and from this is inferred that, after the conversion, the bread is not nothing and consequently is something. But it is not what was before, because what was before has been converted. Nor is it anything other than the term into which it is converted. Therefore, after the conversion it is something, since that which, as being thus what was bread before, is converted is the body of Christ. Or if this be denied, one must grant that a something-ness of Christ’s body belongs to what was bread, and likewise the being of the body of Christ belongs to it, otherwise the bread after the conversion could in no way be said to be something; rather one would have to say that it had been altogether annihilated.
2. Rejection of the Opinion
301. This opinion, then, states two things: both that the bread is not annihilated and that after the conversion it is not nothing but in some way something. And the second of these it deduces from the first.
302. Against the second I argue in four ways.
First as follows: a term of change, insofar as it is a term, includes the non-being of the other term. The proof is that, insofar as it is a term, it has some incompossibility with the other term; therefore, as it is a term, it does not include a something-ness of the other term, nor does it include the other term’s being in any way something, because it is a contradiction that, as it includes that other term’s non-being, it include a something-ness of that same term.
303. Second, because the body of Christ after the consecration is not disposed in any different way than before, therefore, neither does anything have being in it in any different way. But the non-converted bread does not in any way have its something-ness in the body of Christ, nor does it have any something-ness of the body of Christ; therefore it does not have it after the consecration either. Proof of the first consequence: to be in a certain way in something is because of the being simply of that something; for because something is in itself such, therefore does it thus or thus have something in itself. So there is no difference in the way something is in something save because of the difference in itself of that other something.
304. Again, that of which there is a something-ness is formally something by that something-ness. If therefore a something-ness of the body [of Christ] belong now to that which was the substance of bread, then that which was the substance of bread is now formally something by that something-ness. I ask what that something is. Not bread because the bread is not, and it seems a contradiction that by the something-ness of the body it be formally something that it is, namely bread. Nor is that which was the substance of the bread the body by that something-ness, because that which was the substance of bread has simply ceased to be, and the body remains simply in the same being. Nor can it be said that by this something-ness there is something else besides the bread or body.
305. Next, ‘something’ and ‘thing’ are convertible terms, according to Avicenna in his Metaphysics 1.5. That then of which there is a something-ness is formally a thing; and so it would follow that that which was bread would now be a thing. And ‘thing’, according to this doctor, is taken in two ways: in one way for a thing that is opinable, as ‘thing’ is said to come from ‘I think’, ‘you think’; or, in another way, from ‘ratified thing’, insofar as this is said to come from ratification [cf. Ord. I d.3 n.310].29 By this something-ness, therefore, ‘that which was bread’ will be a thing in the first way; and then it follows that it is not more a thing than a chimaera is, for a chimaera is a thing in this way, according to him; and then the annihilation of the bread stands very well with such something-ness (just as if anything were converted into a chimaera it would truly be annihilated). If thing is taken in the second way, then (as before) either the thing is quidditatively bread, and then the bread quidditatively is not converted, or the thing is quidditatively what the body is, and this is impossible because of the quidditative distinction between that which was of the bread and that which was of the body.
B. Opinion of Giles of Rome and its Rejection
306. It is said in another way [Giles of Rome] that the bread is not annihilated because, after its conversion into the body, it remains in the body in potency; for the body of Christ and the bread have a common subject (as the matter), and therefore the substance of the bread can return through conversion of the body into it, and this conversion would not be creation. Therefore, not even this conversion is annihilation, and this because of the common subject in whose potency are both terms.
307. On the contrary: the bread could not, on the basis of this statement, be annihilated while any other body remains; because if any other body remains (at least a corruptible one), matter of the same idea would remain, in whose potency the bread consequently remains, just as now it is said [by Giles] to remain in the matter of Christ’s body. Therefore, the bread could not be annihilated unless the whole of bodily substance were annihilated.30
308. Again, if the bread were annihilated and the body of Christ were present here, the bread would remain in altogether the same way in the potency of the matter of Christ’s body according as it now is; therefore, it should not, because of what it now is in the potency of the matter of Christ’s body, be said to be not annihilated.
309. Again, something that is common to both terms is not necessary save for transmutation properly speaking; because, if one excludes the subject and takes precisely the terms of a transmutation, opposition rather is required in them than something the same that is common. Indeed, something the same that is common to certain things prevents these things from being the per se terms of a transmutation. Therefore, since in this transition there is not properly a change, nor a subject that remains, but only the two terms of the transition, nothing common will per se give or take away from this transition any of its idea; therefore, if this transition (with everything common removed) were annihilation, it will also be annihilation now [sc. on Giles’ theory].
C. Scotus’ own Opinion
310. To the question one can say that, in the issue at hand, nothing of the bread remains after the conversion; and second that the bread is not annihilated or (which is easier) that the bread is not by this conversion annihilated.
1. Nothing of the Bread Remains after the Conversion
311. The first point may be supposed to have been proved by the reasons given against the first opinion [nn.302-305].
2. The Bread is not Annihilated by this Conversion
a. Proof
312. The second point is proved as follows: the term ‘to which’ of this transition of the bread is not pure nothing; therefore, the bread is not annihilated.
The proof of the consequence is that the term ‘to which’ of annihilation is pure nothing. And the proof of this is by a likeness: just as the term ‘from which’ of creation is pure nothing, so the term ‘to which’ of annihilation should be pure nothing.
The proof of the antecedent is that the term of this transition is the body of Christ, because, although negation of the bread be concomitant with the term ‘to which’, yet this term is not altogether nothing but is in something positive.
b. Objection
313. Against this is that, although the positing of Christ’s body here is concomitant with the ceasing to be of the bread, yet the ceasing to be of the bread in its proper and primary idea, as it is distinguished from the positing of Christ’s body, seems to be annihilation; and it is not distinguished from annihilation because its term ‘to which’ is the nothingness of the bread.
314. There is confirmation through a likeness, that corruption now is not annihilation - not because of the mere fact that generation is concomitant with it, for if it were because of this not annihilation, that is, because of the term precisely of generation, then the corruption would, on account of the positive term of the change, be a positive change - which is false. But as it is, corruption in its proper idea, as it is distinguished essentially from the concomitant generation, is not annihilation, because something of the corrupted thing remains (that is, the matter). And from this follows that the negation (to which term the corruption is) is negation in a naturally suited subject; therefore, it is privation. Therefore, from the opposite in the issue at hand, since nothing of the term ‘from which’ remains, and the negation of the being of the bread is not privation (because it is not in a naturally suited subject) but pure non-being, it follows that this destruction of the bread is, in its proper idea, annihilation.
315. And this is confirmed lastly because the per se idea of a thing does not vary with something per accidens concurrent with it; but it is per accidens that with the destruction of the bread the positing of the body here of Christ is concurrent (the proof: for the first could be separated from the second); therefore, the idea of this destruction [of the bread] does not vary because of this positing of the body here of Christ, but the destruction, if it occurred alone without the positing [of the body here], would be annihilation of the bread; therefore it is annihilation now as well.
c. Refutation by Others of the Objection
316. One might in one way say here [Henry of Ghent] that transubstantiation is a change precisely between positive terms, such that two privative terms and two changes will not, as in the case of generation and corruption, be givens there; but just as, according to the Philosopher Physics 5.1.225a8, some change is ‘from subject to subject’, namely a change that has something positive for both per se terms, so does this transubstantiation have precisely two terms, and both are positive. And so one is not to suppose here that the destruction is a sort of per se change formally, and that it would be distinguished in genus from the beginning of the body here of Christ, but that there is only a single transition of this positive term into that positive term.
317. Against this way: it is manifest that ‘the non-being of the bread’ is not formally ‘the being of the body here of Christ’, nor conversely; for it would be possible for the bread not to be and for the body here not to be posited, and conversely; similarly, the ‘non-being of the body here of Christ’ and ‘the being of the bread’ are not formally here the same. So we have the per se terms ‘the being of bread’ and ‘the non-being of bread’, and ‘the being of the body here of Christ’ and ‘the non-being of the body here of Christ’. Likewise, ‘the non-being of the body here of Christ’ and ‘the being of the body here of Christ’ are not the same but opposite terms; so we can have two transitions quidditatively distinct, each of which has two terms of its own. And then the whole of the difficulty remains that was touched on in the case of generation as distinct from corruption [n.316], and in the case of the per se formal distinction of the destruction [of the bread] as it is distinct from the positing of the body here of Christ.
d. Scotus’ Rejection of the Objection
α. Reasons Proving that the Bread is not Simply Annihilated
318. [First reason] - A reply can be made while holding to this conclusion, namely that the bread is not simply annihilated. For the term of annihilation is a pure nothing, that is, because nothing of the term ‘from which’ remains in the term ‘to which’. And negation in a naturally suited subject (which is called ‘privation’ [n.314]) is not the term of annihilation, and conditions opposite to the above conditions [sc. for annihilation] exist in corruption as corruption is negation. And, third, because negation in a disparate31 positive subject is not the term of annihilation but negation simply outside the genus is -that is, outside everything positive or every subject that might be called a privation according to this negation, or according to a disparate subject that might include this negation.
319. And this last point can be made evident, for not only does the matter of corrupted air remain and have the privation of its prior form, but the negation of the form of air is preserved in the form of fire that is newly introduced. And the negation, as it is in the form of fire, is not there as in a subject suited to it (but it is only so in common matter); rather it is there as in something disparate. And even if one removed the negation as it is in the common matter that is now the term of corruption (and because of which corruption is not now annihilation), yet if this negation as in something disparate were the term of some ceasing to be, the air would still not be annihilated.
320. To the issue at hand: although there are here two reasons which make it clear that, because of them, corruption is not annihilation, namely because something of what was corrupted remains and because the negation that is the term of it remains in a naturally suitable subject [nn.319, 314], there is nevertheless a third reason here, namely that the negation that is the term is in something positive, not in a subject but in something disparate.
321. Hereby, then, to the reason [n.313]: one can say that this ceasing to be of the bread in itself, and also as it is toward the non-being of bread, is not negation outside the genus; but as it is in the body it is not annihilation.
322. And the answer now to the example of corruption [n.314] is plain: for it is true that corruption is not denied to be annihilation precisely because of the concomitant generation, but because of those two causes (one of which includes the other), namely that there is a common subject and therefore the negation that is its term is privation. But if the third cause could stand alone without either of these two, namely that negation would be the term as it is in some positive disparate thing, still this transition would not be annihilation; and such is what this conversion is posited as being.
323. But the third argument [n.315, 320] is more compelling, namely about per se and per accidens. For there is found here one per se transition from the being of bread to its non-being, and another from the non-presence here of the body of Christ to the presence of it here. And then, as was argued [n.312], if the second [the presence of the body of Christ] were not concomitant with the first, the first would be a case of annihilation [sc. of the bread]; therefore now too it is formally annihilation, since its idea does not vary because of that which is per accidens concomitant.32
324. [Second reason] - Again, if the bread were annihilated and the body of Christ were posited as being present here, both the bread and body would, as regard every condition both of being and of non-being, be disposed in the same way as they are disposed now. But what is disposed the same as it would be if it were annihilated is itself annihilated; therefore etc . The first proposition is manifest, because if the bread were annihilated, neither its matter nor its form would remain; and they do in the same way not remain now. If too the body were then present under the accidents, it would be present in this way now as well.33
325. [Third reason] - Again (and this is directly against the last response given to the point about corruption [n.317]): because the term, as being the term of a new action, is itself new, therefore the negation of the being of the bread, as it is the term of the ceasing to be of the bread, is new. But as it is in the body of Christ, it is not new, for the way that the disparate thing [sc. Christ’s body] includes the negation of the disparate thing [sc. the bread], the body of Christ was non-bread before the ceasing to be of the bread.
326. If you say “it is true that ‘non-bread’, as it is in the body [of Christ], is not a new negation, just as neither is the separation of the body from the bread new,” - on the contrary: from this follows that the non-being of the bread is the term, because, as this negation is in the body of Christ, it is so, according to this response, by reason of the separation; if therefore non-being is the term as new, it is the term not as it is in the body by reason of the separation.
327. [Fourth reason] - Again, when changes of diverse genera concur together, negation is not the per se term of either of them as it is included in the term of the other. An example: if generation and change of place are together, the negation that is term of the corruption accompanying the generation is not the term of it per se as it is preserved in its ‘where’ (and this is proved by reason, that where the negation of the term ‘from which’ of one change is per se preserved in the term ‘to which’ of the other change, these changes must be of the same genus, because the term ‘to which’ and the term ‘from which’ are opposites). But in the issue at hand, the body of Christ here absolutely does not include the non-being of the bread, as is plain, because the separation of the body from the bread existed while both extremes remained; therefore, it only includes the negation of the being of the bread as it is here. But this term ‘as it is here’ does not pertain to the genus of substance; therefore, this negation is not the per se term of the destruction [sc. of the bread] the way it is preserved in the body as the body is here.
β. On the Possibility of Evading these Reasons
328. Some of these reasons [nn.318-327] can be evaded:
329. [About the second reason] - The second [n.324] as follows: when denying this proposition, namely “what is disposed to being and non-being in every way it would be if it were annihilated is itself annihilated,” one would have to add in the subject the words “and altogether the same thing succeeds to it.” And that this addition is necessary is sufficiently plain, because before a thing is created it is as much nothing as if had been created before and afterwards annihilated, and yet before it is created it is not annihilated. And why? Because in this case its nothingness does not succeed to its being. So I say that, if the bread were annihilated, neither matter nor form would remain, just as they do not remain now. But yet now something succeeds to the total being of the bread which then would not succeed; because now negation in genus, namely in some positive disparate thing, succeeds, but in then negation simply outside the genus would succeed.
330. [About the third reason] - To the third reason [n.325] one could say that negation, as it is included in its disparate subject, is not incompatible with the affirmation of it in the common idea of being; otherwise disparate things could not both be beings together. But the negation in the case of a contradiction is repugnant to the affirmation, even in the whole range of being. If therefore the disparate negation of the bread [sc. negation in something disparate] were in Christ’s body beforehand, nevertheless the contradictory negation of its being is not. But now, after the conversion, the contradictory negation is in the body of Christ; and thus it is new, because it follows the affirmation that contradicts it.
331. Against this: it does not in any way seem that the contradictory negation is in the body more than it was before; and so, as it is new and is the term of the ceasing to be of the bread, it is not the term as the term is in the body. Also, the contradictory negation is pure nothing, and so a pure nothing is said of something positive, as if it were said of a chimaera; therefore, if the negation is the term of this ceasing to be, it follows that this ceasing to be will be a pure nothing.
332. If it be said to the first point here [n.331] that the non-being of the bread, as it contradicts the being of the bread, is in the body of Christ otherwise than it was before, because the contradictory non-being is included in the body of Christ as that body is here, while in the body of Christ absolutely only the disparate negation is included - this is refuted by the fourth reason [n.327], because the later term is not the idea of a new incompossibility with anything that is naturally prior. Therefore ‘it as here’ is not the idea of a new incompossibility of the body with the being of the bread. So one must say that the negation is not new and then it is not the term of the ceasing to be; or if it is new and not in the body as the body is here (because the presence is not the idea according to which such incompossiblity exists in it), in no way will the negation as it is in the body be the term of the ceasing to be of the bread.
e. Conclusion
333. The third reason [n.323] therefore can be maintained, namely the second member of the distinction posited above [ibid.], that destruction is annihilation of the bread absolutely. The reasoning about ‘per accidens’ is proof, that because the ‘non-being simply’ of the bread must be said to succeed to the ‘being simply’ of the bread, and because this succeeding of opposite to opposite is per accidens conjoined simply to the succeeding of ‘the presence of Christ’s body here’ to its ‘non-presence here’, therefore the latter will have two per se terms different from the per se terms of the former. Therefore the per se term of the latter will not be the per se term, or not precisely, as it is conjoined per accidens to the per se term of the former change.
334. I also say that the bread is not annihilated in this conversion of the bread into the body. This is made clear as follows, that (as was said in the preceding question [n.166]) one kind of transubstantiation is that whereby the term receives ‘being simply’, and another kind is that whereby it receives ‘being here’. As to the former kind, whereby one term receives ‘being simply’ and the other term ‘non-being simply’, perhaps the fact that the destruction of the term ‘from which’ is not simply annihilation could be saved, because there the per se term ‘to which’ of its beginning would be opposite to the term ‘from which’ of its ceasing (as is the case with the term ‘from which’ and ‘to which’ of generation and corruption), and the negation there of the term ‘from which’ as it is in the term ‘to which’ could be the term of the ceasing. But in the issue at hand, where the conversion is only a transition that introduces the term ‘to which’ of the per se positive change, it is not opposed to the term ‘from which’ of the privative change; and so it cannot be a reason for including the negation of it.
335. One could say, therefore, that this conversion is as of substance to substance, not insofar as it is to the being simply of the substance but as it is to the ‘being here’ of it, so that, just as the body as here succeeds to the bread as here, so the bread as here is converted into the body as here. And these changes, though they are between substances, yet they are changes as between substances, not as between terms; for the terms are only present-ness and non-present-ness, which can be reduced to the genus ‘where’, as was said in d.10 q.1 nn.35, 55.
336. Therefore, just as the body in the positive change does not acquire ‘being simply’ but ‘being here’, so in the corresponding depriving change (which this conversion includes, insofar as this conversion is a transitioning but not a productive transubstantiation) - this change, I say, does not take away the ‘being simply’ of the bread but its ‘being here’. And the beauty of the correspondence is sufficiently plain, because just as the body has a new presence without losing its old presence and states an acquisitive change without a depriving change (as was said in d.10 q.1 nn.48-49), so conversely the bread has a depriving change without an acquisitive change, because it ceases to be here and does not acquire another presence elsewhere.
337. Because, therefore, nothing is acquired or lost through this conversion, as it is a transitioning conversion, save only ‘being here’ and ‘non-being here’, the result is that, by this conversion as it is here, substantial being is not lost and so not annihilated; indeed neither is the bread destroyed by this conversion. However, because the bread does not remain in its substantial being and is, by this conversion, not destroyed (as was said), it must be that it cease to be by the ceasing to be that is from the ‘being of it simply’ to the ‘non-being of it simply’. Now the ‘non-being of it’, although it is quasiconcomitant with the presence of the body of Christ as that body is here, yet not as it is a term of the same genus; and so, if this destruction, considered in itself, be annihilation, yet in no way is the conversion annihilation.
338. An example of this: if the bread were destroyed and an angel were newly created and became present to the species of the bread, the conversion of the bread into the angel would be ‘of the bread as it is here’ into ‘the angel as it is present here’, and by this conversion the angel would only acquire that presence. However the new ‘being’ that is the term of the angel’s own creation would be concomitant with this new presence.
339. This way of speaking makes apparent which transubstantiation can be into something preexistent and which cannot, and which can be when the term ‘from which’ remains and which cannot. For the transubstantiation that is from term to term as to the ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ simply of the terms cannot be of something that is converted and yet remains, nor can it be conversion into a preexisting term. However, the transubstantiation that is a transition of substance to substance as to ‘being here’ can also be of a term ‘from which’ that remains (so that if it cease to be here, yet not cease simply to be and something else as it is here succeed to it). This transition can also be into a preexisting term, if the term begin to be here without beginning to be. Possible too is that the term ‘from which’ is destroyed, but not destroyed by this conversion; and possible that the term ‘to which’ begin to be, and not begin to be by this conversion, as was illustrated by the example of the created angel [n.338].
II. To the Initial Arguments of the First Part
340. To the initial arguments.
As to the first argument [n.293], if the first member of the disjunctive set down at the beginning of the solution [n.310] is held to, the major of the argument is to be denied [n.293: ‘that which existed before, and of which nothing remains, is annihilated’]; for one must add that ‘nothing of it remains and nothing simply succeeds to it as a per se term’.
341. As to the second [n.294] the same point holds: although it is nothing in itself or in another, yet its being is not succeeded by altogether nothing.
342. As to the third [n.295], one must deny that the form is annihilated in corruption.
343. And as to the proof that ‘it only remains in the potency of the matter’, I say that ‘its remaining in the potency of matter’ is ‘the other part of the composite remaining per se’; and so does the form too remain per accidens; but that of which something either per se or per accidens remains is not annihilated.
344. And when you argue that the numerically same thing could return through a natural agent, I say that this does not follow, because the potency in which the form remains must be understood as a potential principle, and not as a respect. For when the form is corrupted, the respect of the potency to the form does not remain, because the respect of the potency is not to what is altogether past, just as neither is it to what is altogether impossible. But the potential principle remains per se, and the form (which was something of the whole) remains per accidens according to some part of itself. Or one could say briefly that although nothing of the form of what is corrupted remains, yet the negation that succeeds to it is a negation in a fitting subject, and so is a privation. And a privation is not of a nature to be the term of annihilation.
345. And when this is applied to the issue at hand, then although [the bread] is required to remain so as to be said not to be annihilated, and although the form of the bread does not thus remain because its matter transitions into matter, I say that for many reasons, as stated before [n.314], corruption is not said to be annihilation; and although these two points suffice, namely that the subject remains and the negation that is the term is a privation [ibid.], yet if the negation that is the term were some negation in a genus, as in some disparate positive thing, still the transition to it would not be annihilation.
346. To the fourth argument [n.296] it can be said that not every production of the whole substance is creation, but the production that is from a term ‘from which’ as from what is purely nothing; and so the answer here is by assertion of the opposite, if the second member of the disjunctive posited in the solution to the question is held to [nn.310, 340]. But from this the conclusion does not follow that the bread is annihilated by this conversion, but only that its annihilation is concomitant with this conversion.
III. To the Arguments for the Opposite
347. As to the reason for the opposite [nn.297, 238]: Ambrose is speaking of the conversion of terms not according to ‘being simply’ but according to ‘being in a certain respect’.
348. As to the next, about creation [n.298], the answer is plain from the solution to the last argument of the first part [n.346].
349. As to Augustine [n.299] I reply that God does not annihilate things by any positive action; but just as he conserves things by acting positively, so annihilating creatures is to stop conserving them, and God can do this.